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Washington University, St. Louis 
Let us recognize at the outset that it Is difficult to arouse public interest 
In the question of the adequacy of investment capital in the United States in the 
years ahead. First of all, to many citizens any discussion of capital immediately 
conjures up visions of greedy bankers, wealthy coupon-clippers and -- to use what 
Is to many a pejorative phrase -- capitalists. 
The members of this association well understand the pivotal role of capital 
Investment in providing the basis for the future standard of living of a society, 
for increasing productivity and thus providing an opportunity for the society to 
dampen down Inflationary pressures while simultaneously providing rising real in-
comes. But we must realize that a great many of our fellow citizens lack that 
·economic sophistication, at least at the present time. 
As an educator, at times I find it amusing when some of my students discover 
Maoist economists writing about the need to hold down consumption In the Chinese 
economy in order to free up the capital resources needed to invest in the future 
growth of that economy. "Why they are not even a capitalistic society, 11 they will 
note in wonderment. Then the thought will sink in-- sometimes with a little 
faculty assistance-- that a rising stock of capital is necessary for any growing 
society, capitalistic (i.e., private enterprise or market-oriented) or other. It 
Is really a basic matter of how much we want to eat, drink, and be merry today 
and how much we want to set aside for the future. Boiled down to its fundamentals, 
assuring an adequate flow of saving and Investment Is little more than demonstrat-
ing a proper concern for the future. 
~: The author acknowledges the assistance of Janice Pyatte in the research 
underlying this paper. 
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But there is a more technical set of problems that face the serious student 
of what I call capital adequacy In the United States. Frankly, it is very awkward 
to talk about capital shortages at a time when so many American industries report 
excess capacity. After all, current manufacturing output is about one-fifth below 
the potential which could be produced at nonna1 operating rates. It Is no less 
awkward to urge reducing emphasis on consumption at a time when the average consumer 
has experienced a marked reduction in his or her real living standard. Despite 
the recovery to date, real consumer .outlays per capita are below what they were at 
the start of the recent recession. 
Moreover, at least one prestigious New York City financial institution deplores 
the very notion of capital shortages, noting that in every time period ~he total 
flow of saving inevitably winds up equal to the amount of investment which is 
made. Heanwhi le 1 a large Wa.shlngton-based research organization tells us that, for 
a very considerable future period, sufficient savings are likely to be forthcoming 
to meet anticipated Investment requirements. 
Given the well nigh universal propensity of virtually every element of the 
society to advocate cutting its taxes -- and/or increasing the expenditures devoted 
to the causes that It favors -- should we not dismiss the continued pleas for na-
tional policies to foster more saving and investment as merely misguided or self-
serving appeals on the part of higher income se.gments of the population? Certainly 
there are many who respond to that question with a loud and unequivocal ••ves••. 
Those who are familiar with my views know that I do believe that there are Im-
portant reasons to be concerned about the future adequacy of savlng.·and Investment. 
in the United States. Yet, in passing, feel obliged to point out that the 
naivete and exaggeration on the part of some of the proponents of the capital 
shortage notion inevitably have triggered adverse reactions. 
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Let us take up four key aspects that need to be considered fn dealing with 
the question facing us today. The first point is a necessary distinction between 
current, short-term conditions and future, longer-term needs. The second point is 
a basic understanding of the process by which a sluggish potential flow of saving 
is made to equal what appears to be an ex~essively robust set of investment demands. 
The third is a little excursion into the never-n~ver world of long-teMm economic 
forecasting. The fourth and final point Is an examination of the role of public 
policy, both in Influencing the flow of saving and Investment and in meeting other 
national priorities. 
Short-Term Glut Versus Lons-Term Shortage? 
Let us clear the air and state that, as a general proposition and under most · 
conceivable circumstances, there will not be widespread shortages of productive 
capacity In the United States in the coming year.or two. In effect, I am saying, 
let us not cry wolf prematurely. But by Its very nature, capital Investment is 
much more a matter of the future than of the present. If an electric utility de-
cides today to build a new generating facility, that will not increase the supply 
of electricity this year or next year or the year after. If •nything, the needs of 
construction will add to the demand for energy in the short run. 
But if we are to meet the likely growth in power needs during the 1980 1 s, this 
'nation must make the necessary investments in new capacity today -- If not yester-
day. Capital investment sucely Is the prime example of that extended economic pro-
cess where It is foolish to hold your fire until you see the whites of their eyes, 
or the green of the consumers• demand. 
VIewed in a more fundamental way, of course, it Is new investments of various 
kinds-- physical capital, so-called human capital In the form of education and 
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training, and research and development-- which will provide the rising productivity 
and output which in turn are the fundamental bases for sustainable Increases in 
cpnsumer living standards. 
To a very considerable extent, the economic policies to be followed in the 
coming year will be major determinants of the economy 1s ability to avoid widespread 
shortages, at least for the period until 1980. To the extent that monetary and 
fiscal policy will remain on the relatively modest course that has now been set, 
existing and planned Increases in plant and equipment should generally be adequate 
to the economy 1s demands through most of the 1970 1 s. To be sure, sporadic shortages 
of specific Industrial supplies are likely to arise from time to time, as they have 
in the past. After 1980, the prospects seem less optimistic and will depend on the 
enactment of some of the specific proposals that I will present a little later. 
Should, however, the President and the Congress adopt a far more expansionary 
set of policies, then we might soon find the economy pushing the limits of Indus-
trial capacity, particularly in such key sectors as steel. Allen Sinai and Roger 
Brinner have estimated the consequences of a more stimulating policy-- one 
characterized by average annual growth rates of 9-10 percent_ tn the money supply 
and a fiscal policy eased by $15 billion of additional tax cuts in 1976. Under 
that alternative, they estimate a capital shortage by 1978, in both financial and 
physical senses. 
Short and long-term Interest rates, under that scenario, would soar to double 
digit levels. The accompanying bottlenecks in production would result in rapid 
price Increases in chemicals, plastics, lumber, paper, textiles, metals, metal 
products, machinery, and transportation equipment. After the resulting boom and 
recession cycle, it would be extremely difficult to stabilize the economy.ll Those 
who scoff at the possibility of a capital shortage and simultaneously urge a more 
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expansionary economic policy would seem to be plainly inconsistent In their analysis. 
Eguatlns Saving and Investment 
Some economists, as well as others, seem to be offended by studies that show 
for some future year -- a yawning gap between the amount of saving that will be 
available and the amount of investment that will be desired. They note, quite 
properly, that we are dealing with an accounting identity. Unlike many of the 
speeches based on it, the often-cited study by the New York Stock Exchange does 
clearly and properly distinguish between (1) the gap that they show between fore-
casted saving and Investment flows and (2) the equality-- at some level --of the 
actual saving and investment that will take place.l/ 
We need to understand that the equality between actual saving and actual In-
vestment is similar to the equality, on business balance sheets, of assets and 
liabilities (including net worth). Yet, at the company level, we do not let the 
simple accounting Identity inhibit serious analysis. We understand that the 
Assets = Llabi 1 ities relationship is true alike for bankrupt concerns as wel ·l as 
the most profitable corporations. Similarly, we need to remind ourselves that for 
a national economy, Saving = Investment, both in the case of a rapidly growing 
economy, as well as for a stagnant or even declining one. There are serious ques-
tions to be considered: At what level does the balancing of saving and investment 
take place? What investment needs are rationed (or 11crowded11 ) out in the process? 
What types of Investments are actually funded? 
As Henry Wallfch has pointed out, capital Inadequacy can show up in various 
forms. First, it can manifest Itself in bottleneck situations, with some Industries 
not having enough capacity to provide their customers when the economy as a whole 
Is operating at a high level. Second, an overall shortage of capital with respect 
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to the labor force Is possible, even If capacity is fairly evenly distributed among 
industries. Under such conditions, there would not be enough jobs to provide full 
employment even when Industry is operating close to capacity.l/ The joint concern 
of business and labor in Increasing productive capacity In such event would be 
obvious. 
A more specialized definition of capital shortage has been developed by Sinai 
and Brlnner. They use the term to refer to an economy which meets either of two 
conditions: (1) the financial system fails to provide the necessary funds to 
finance the economy 1s expenditures at reasonably stable rates of interest or (2) 
capital expenditures are Insufficient to generate enough capacity to meet the de-
mands of the economy at reasonably stable prices. Wallich contends that during 
periods in 1973 and 1974, the American economy experienced the two sets of symptoms 
of capital shortage that he describes. Sinal and Brlnner warn us about the possi-
bility of experiencing their two definitions of capital shortages within the very 
next few years. 
We do need to point out that it is generally the newer and smaller businesses 
rather than the larger and better established companies that get crowded out of 
credit markets during periods of financial stringency. That should be of concern 
to all who favor a competitive economy. And the available data are striking. Of 
the $6.4 billion of bonds Issued by the companies listed in the Fortune 500, $5.1 
billion was raised by the top 100 and $1.3 billion by the next 400. The top 100 
companies reported 28 bond issues in 1974 and the bottom 100 only 1.!/ 
It is not my purpose today to p~ovlde yet another set of computer runs of 
future capital supply and demand. But there are Important reasons to expect that 
saving In the years ahead will be weak by historical standards and investment needs 
and demands quite strong. 
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On the supply side, several baste factors will be dampening down the potential 
for generating saving in the corning decade. In absolute terms, of course, there 
will be large Increases In funds available for investment. Important forces, how-
ev~r, will be exercising a depressing effect on the growth rate of saving. Con-
sumers, who are a basic source of saving in the economy, will be experiencing some 
adverse factors. The changing age distribution of the United States population 
suggests that, if past savings patterns are maintained, the personal saving rate 
(although not the absolute amount) could decline over the coming decade. 
Just compare the anticipated trends In the low-saving age groups with the high-
saving age brackets. That does not require much forecasting ability because we are 
talking about people who aee already born and living in the United States. The 
prospects are very unfavorable. The number of Americans in the high-spending, low-
saving age brackets (20-34) will be rising substantially, from 46 million In 1972 
to 60 million In 1982. These are the young people who borrow heavily, particularly 
to finance and furnish new homes. Most of the people who shift from renting to 
buying a home are under 35. In striking contrast, the high saving age brackets 
(40-54) will show a decline In absolute numbers, from 36 million in 1972 to 34 mil-
lion in 1982. 
Another factor dampening down the private saving rate Is the repeated liberali-
zation of social security and other government welfare programs. This relationship 
has been noted by several scholars, liberal and conservative. Recent studies show 
that the provision of public pensions substantially depresses the rate of private 
saving.i/ With the social security system operating at best on a pay•a.s-you-go 
basis, there is no offsetting government saving. Should the system begin to operate 
at a deficit, there would be government dlssavlng. 
I am going to skip over lightly the question of the adequacy of business saving, 
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not because It Is unimportant. Rather, others, notably George Terborgh, already 
have done such a thorough and convincing job of explaining how Inflation has result-
ed in substantial overstatements of real business profits, especially as a result 
of inadequate depreciation allowances and tsansient inventory profits.§/ Real 
corporate profits (adjusted for these factors) declined by over 40 percent In the 
past decade, from $37.0 billion in 1965 to $20.6 billion In 1974. 
On the demand side, In contrast, there clearly will be many rising needs for 
capital Investment, both to meet new priorities such as domestic energy reliance 
as well as the requirements directly imposed on business by government. For example, 
both public and private projections show that rising annual dollar outlays for new 
pollution control facilities will be required to meet existing legal requirements. 
About 5 percent of Industrial plant and equipment Investments are expected to be 
devoted to these purposes. In addition, government-mandated industrial safety .and 
noise abatement outlays will be significant, with estimates ranging to $4o 
billion or more during the coming 5-year period.l/ These government-mandated in-
vestment requirements help to explain the anomoly of a declining return on capital, 
which Is supposed to be a characteristic of a capital surplus economy. It Is 
evident that the typical firm realizes little If any return on these involuntary 
.outlays. Thus a larger than average return is earned on the voluntary capital in-
vestments that are made. 
The Natu·re of Economic Forecasting 
Intentional or not, some economists seem to be competing for the role former-
ly played by the late Jack Be~ny, that of being a first-rate ·dead-pan comedian. 
am refer·ring to those analysts who tell us, with a seemingly straight face, that 
saving flows will be adequate to the investment financing task in the decade ahead, 
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provided only that the Federal Government learns to operate at a surplus for an 
extended period of time-- an eventuality as likely as my becoming young and hand-
some tomorrow. 
To back that up, they cite several public and private forecasts that show that, 
by 1980 or some other future year, the Federal Government may be operating at a 
surplus, and thus adding to the availability of private capital funds. For example, 
the President 1 s January budget estimates a margin of $35 billion by which revenues 
would exceed outlays, on a full-employment basis in 1980.~/ 
Do not be misled by these statistical exercises. I have done them myself and 
find them very useful. But we must recognize th~m as a form of mental gymnastics. 
The key to understanding these, as well as any other long-term· forecasts, is to 
look at the underlying assumptions. That is critical In this case. The key assump-
tion, which may not always be apparent to the users of these forecasts, Is that no 
further change will be made In the expenditure programs or revenue structure of 
the Federal Government. 
This Is plainly unrealistic. If there Is anything that can be forecast with 
confidence, it Is that over the years the Congress will pass laws increasing the 
scope of existing programs and instituting new spending programs. Likely candi-
dates are not hard to find, ranging from incentives to explore and develop new 
domestic energy sources to a national health Insurance program. 
Please do not interpret this as an attack on the projections per se, but on 
thei~ use. They are not Intended to be forecasts of reality. Rather, they are a 
useful Input into the policy planning process. They Indicate the amount of discre-. 
tion that Is available to increase outlays and/or cut taxes within the existing 
budget structure. In the futur.e, as in the past, the publlc 1 s appetite for new 
government services and benefits is likely to outrun its willingness to pay for 
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this largesse in the form of higher taxes. Thus, on balance, the Federal Government 
is likely to run deficits and on balance, to be not a supplier but an Important 
user of investment funds in the years ahead. 
The Role of Public Polley 
Before we consider possible changes In public policy, It Is Important to under-
stand the impact of existing policies. We feequently hear that our cureent tax 
system is biased in favor of consumption and against saving. If you have any doubt 
about the matter, I believe that you can resolve It quickly with a very simple and 
straightforward example. 
Let us take the case of three factory workers, A, B, and c. Each Is of the 
same age, has the same work experience and size of family, and earns the same wages. 
To keep it simple, let us also assume that each rents the house that he (or she) 
lives in. 
Hr. A regularly spends what he earns, no more and no less. Hr. B. Is our saver. 
Each week he deposits a portion of his paycheck into his savings account. Mr. C is 
the big spender. Not only does he spend everything _he earns, but he borrows to the 
hilt, buying as much on credit as he can. And now for the key question: Which of 
the three pays the most Income tax and which pays the least? Clearly, Hr. B, the 
saver, will have the highest tax bill, paying taxes on his wages as well as on the 
Interest that he earns on his savings account. 
Mr. c. winds up with the lowest tax bill, as he receives a tax deduction for 
the Interest he pays on his borrowings. Actual practice of course includes many 
variations in the tax treatment of financial transactions. Yet, as a general prin-
ciple, it does seem that, for the average citizen, the existing personal income tax 
structure does favor consumption over saving. In addition, many of the government 
spending programs operate with a similar effect. 
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Let us assume that A, B, and C all get laid off at the same time and none of 
them obtains a new job. Hr. c, the big spender, will be the first one who will be 
eligible to receive welfare, food stamps, and related benefits. Mr. A, the pay-as-
you-go man, will be next. And the last to qualify for the federal assistance will 
be Hr. B, the big saver. Unlike the good Lord, the Feds do not seem to help those 
who help themselves. 
What can be done to provide greater encouragement to saving and Investment? 
The first and perhaps most important idea that comes to mind Is essentially a nega-
tive one. The Federal Government should stop being such a large dissaver. That 
is, it should eliminate or at least reduce the massive extent to which it currently 
competes with the private sector for the relatively limited supply of investment 
capital. As the economy continues to recover from Its recession lows, the rising 
pace of business activity will yield Increasing flows of federal revenues. Unless 
Congress increases government spending at that same rapid rate, the result will be 
a substantial · reduction In the federal deficit In 1977 and 1978. The result is not 
a foregone conclusion. The advocates of economy will have to·exert sufficient 
political pressures to offset the propinents of greater government spending. 
There Is a related question, which is far more technical, and hence for which 
there Is little public support or even understanding. I am referring to the need 
to curtail the various off-budget agencies. These are mere subterfuges whereby 
normal federal expenditures do not show pp in the budget. Not only do these ex-
penditures continue but, because they are no longer subject to the scrutiny of the 
budgetary process, they are expanding at a far more rapid rate. In fiscal 1972, 
they totaled $249 million. In the fiscal 1976 budget they are estimated at over 
$10 billion. That is $10 billion that the United States government has to borrow 
above and beyond the official budget deficit. Should the proposal for an off-
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budget Energy Independence Agency be adopted, the stze of thts category would more 
than triple. 
It is with very great reluctance that I call your attention to one specific 
off-budget agency, the Federal Financing Bank. was among many who had high hopes 
that this new government agency would Introduce some needed sense to federal credit 
programs and reduce the proliferation of so-called agency issues which are constant-
ly entering the money and credit markets. To a significant degree, the Financing 
Bank Is serving that Initial purpose of reducing the variety of federally-related 
debt issues. But unfortunately, like so many government activities, the Bank .is 
also perfonming functions not intended by Its original sponsors. It is also buy-
Ing debt Issued by private organizations and other institutions outside of the 
Federal Government In cases where·th~se Issues carry a government guarantee. That•s 
just what we don 1 t need -- something that increases the Treasury•s borrowing needs 
further still. The Congress should promptly repeal the authorization for the 
Federal Financing Bank to provide credit to private (non-Federal) borrowers. 
A second useful contribution that the Federal Government can make to ensure 
capital adequacy In the years ahead is In the area of government controls over · 
business. An Increasing number of regulatory agencies Impose investment require-
ments on business firms, investments which do not generate more productive capacity 
but are Intended to meet various social priorities. I do not propose that all of 
these social requirements be eliminated but, rather, that they be subject to the 
rigors of a benefit/cost test. These expensive federal regulatory requirements 
should only be continued where It can be demonstrated that their value or benefit 
to the society exceeds the costs that they Impose on the ' public. 
must confess that I am far more enthusiastic about the ·desirability of these 
essentially negative approaches than I am about the various possibilities for 
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providing positive incentives to saving and/or investment. In a sense, my advice 
to the Congress is a variation of an old plea, 11Don•t just stand there, undo some-
thlng.11 
But now let us turn to those more positive possibilities. ·a do believe that 
there are some important and useful lessons to be learned from the past. The more 
specific the focus of a federal tax Incentive, the more likely that inefficiencies 
and other unwanted side-effects are going to result. At this point I certainly 
have no desire to add to the difficulties that the real estate Investment trusts 
(REITs) are facing. But we do need to acknowledge that the situation was made 
possible by special-interest tax legislation which permits the REITs --unlike most 
other corporations -- to deduct the dividends they pay out from their taxable in-
come. 
What is needed Is true tax reform of general applicability. To a growing num-
ber of economists, both liberal and conservative, the most economically sensible 
and efficient approach to increasing private saving is to reduce the corporate in-
come tax. That action would have a number of desirable effects. Clearly, a lower 
corporate Income tax rate would increase after-tax corporate profits. That also 
should increase the amount of business 11saving11 in the form of retained earnings. 
But not all of the tax reduction Is likely to be saved. Some of the added profits 
would be disbursed in the form of higher dividends, and Individual disposable in-
come and personal saving wou·ld rise. To some extent, the tax saving may also be 
shifted a• forward to consumers in the form of lower prices or rather more slowly 
rising prices, and backward to labor in the form of higher wages, salaries, and 
fringe benefits. The widespread nature of these resultant benefits are hardly 
cause for concern. Their precise distribution would depend on the operation of 
market forces. 
- 14 -
A lower corporate Income tax rate would reduce the indirect but pervasive role 
of the tax collector In internal business decision-making. It would tend to pro-
mote more efficient use of resources to the extent that fewer low priority business 
expenses would be incurred merely because they are tax deductible. It would soften 
the double taxation of corporate Income. A lower corporate Income tax would also 
reduce the current bias in the tax system toward debt financing -- because interest 
paid on debt is deductible from taxable Income and In most cases dividends on equity 
capital are not. Rising debt/equity ratios and declining Interest coverages on 
corporate balance sheets clearly demonstrate the importance of permitting a greater 
reliance on equity rather than on debt financing in the future. 
· C. Lowell Harriss has also pointed out that the present corporate Income tax 
may contain some of the most regressive elements in the entire tax system. He has 
in mind the portion of the corporate income tax that reduces the Income that would 
otherwise be available to such ••capitalistlc11 shareholders as philanthropic lnsti• 
tutions, foundations, universities, and employee pension funds. Harriss contrasts 
this with a tax at the personal level which can differentiate among various cate• 
gorles of people on some rational or fair basis • .2/ 
But, unlike the negative suggestions that I made earlier, we have to acknow-
ledge that tax cuts would increase the federal deficit and thus Increase the amount 
of government bor_towing that competes with private investment demands. Hopefully, 
the beneficial impacts on production and employment of a cut in corporate income 
taxes \«>uld generate 11feedback11 effects which would result in some significant 
compensating Increases in federal revenues. Unfortunately, In the past, most pro-
posals for reducing the corporate Income tax have been defeated by what may be 
termed demagogic appeals against reducing the tax burden on the ••undeserving r.lch11 • 
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Professor Charles Mclure of Rice University states unequivocally, on the basts 
of his examination of the public finance literature, that a separate tax on corpora-
tion income cannot be justified under commonly accepted canons of taxation.lQ/ 
Yet, Tilford Gaines offered what may be the simplest and most effective response: 
110f the many approaches that might be taken to lower unemployment rates permanently, 
i.e., to create more jobs, encouragement to capital Investment must rank number 
one.••l!/ 
Nevertheless, at least in the past, it seems easter to get far less efficient 
special Interest legislation Into law. If the naive advocates of closing tax 
"loopholes11 have their way, what we will see Is the enactment of punitive legisla-
tion further reducing the incentive and ability of the private sector to save and 
invest. 
It Is ironic that . the pressures to increase capital gains taxation, for example, 
are far st~nger in the United States than in other industrialized nations, although 
our tax burden on such gains already is so much higher. · In France, the Netherlands, 
and West Germany, for example, capital gains are generally exempt from income tax. 
If lhaCongress does take specific action in the corporate tax area, rather than 
11tfghtening11 up on capital gains, it should give favorable consideration to convert-
Ing depreciation allowances to a true capital recovery system. This of course 
could be done by shifting the depreciation base from historical cost to current 
replacement cost. Such forward looking action would go a long way to halting the 
decline of real saving in the business sector of the private economy. 
The depreciation practices of other leading lndustrlallzed .nations are in 
general far more liberal. Even including the effect of the investment credit and 
the ADR, only about 23.5 percent of a new Investment In machinery and equipment 
can be written off In the first year under our federal tax system, while France 
allows 31.3 percent, Japan allows 37.1 percent, Canada, 50.0 percent, and the United 
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Kingdom a full 100 percent. 
Encouragement to Individual or consumer saving could be accomplished through 
the legislation introduced by Senator Paul Fannin (S.4o54) and Representative Jack 
Kemp (H.R.7240 and H.R.7241). Senator Fannin 1s bill would exclude from gross in-
come the first $1,000 of interest on deposits In Sqvlngs institutions. Congressman 
Kemp 1 s proposal would provide a 10 percent tax credit for the first $1,000 of funds 
either deposited Into a savings account or used to purchase the stock or bonds of· 
a domestic corporation. It would also eliminate double taxation of common stock 
dividends and lighten the tax load on capital gains. 
These are attractive proposals which would begin to move the federal tax 
structure away from taxing saving and Investment so heavily and toward placing 
more of the burden on consumption. The timing of their enactment no doubt will be 
Influenced stron9ly by the overall state of the Federal Budget and by competing 
demands on the public purse. 
Conclusion 
The government 1s role as a competitor for and an allocator of investment funds 
in our economy needs to be restricted substantially. We also need greater public 
recognition that the governmental credit device does nothing to expand the volume 
of capital funds available to the economy. It involves literally robbing Peter to 
pay (or lend to) Paul. But it is a game that government often likes to play--
because it looks so painless to the taxpayer. More fu~damentally, an economic 
environment needs to be created that Is more conducive to private saving and invest-
ment. 
Unless we as a nation act on many fronts to encourage private saving and to 
dampen down government competition for Investment funds -- a lower tax burden on 
saving, less deficit spending, and more realistic regulation-- we must seriously 
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consider the very real possibility that this nation will soon be entering a period 
in which the underlying demand for capital tends to outrun the supply of saving 
to finance ft. In practice, of course, available saving will be allocated one way 
or another among the various categories of Investment requirements. But a high 
average level of interest rates is likely to be the balancing factor and numerous 
weaker demanders of capita) -- notably small and new business, local governments, 
and individuals-- will be elbowed out of financial markets and thus will obtain 
smaller real shares of the nation 1s resources. Hence, gearing public policy to 
encouraging an adequate flow of saving and investment does indeed show a proper 
concern for the future. 
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